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Abstract: The philosophical nature of the two versions of 
paraphrasing the Gorgias' treatise On Non-Being — the skeptical 
version by Sextus Empiricus and the peripatetic version by an 
anonymous author — are discussed. The paper gives a comparative 
analysis of the arguments upheld by the informants enunciating 
Gorgias' thoughts, demonstrates the range of philosophical problems, 
which Gorgias considered, judging by the narratives of his speech, 
and shows how both versions add to and clarify each other in terms 
of philosophical issues. The work provides insights as to how Gorgias 
modernizes and transforms the initial attitudes of Parmenides, 
shifting the reasoning plan: from how thought can be directed to an 
object and the qualities of this object to how thought can be directed 
to the non-existent. Accordingly, the problems of intentionality in the 
Gorgias' teaching are considered as well as the privileged status of 
any of mental states, the nature of word or speech as an autonomous 
way to develop knowledge about external objects, the issue of 
meaning as a reference, and inter-subjectivity in cognition. A 
conclusion is reached that giving preference to one of the 
paraphrasing versions considerably impoverishes our understanding 
of the Gorgias' teaching, while the joint analysis of both versions 
demonstrates the engagement of the sophistic issues, raised by 
Gorgias, in the general philosophic and, particularly, epistemological 
paradigm of the ancient as well as modern philosophy. 
Keywords: Gorgias, Parmenides, argumentation, argumentative 
structure, ancient epistemology. 
 
 
Two versions of Gorgias' speech On Non-Being or On Nature 
(further on referred to as ΟΝΒ) are known. The first survived in the 
treatise Against the Logicians (AM VII 65–87) by Sextus Empiricus), 
the second survived as part of De Melisso, Xenophane, Gorgia 
(further on referred to as MXG) (V–VI. 979a11–980b21) by an 
anonymous Peripatetic author. The two versions not only present 
Gorgias' arguments differently but also were assessed differently by 
scholars in terms of the authenticity and  the details of its narrative 
and philosophical content. Discussions as to which of the two 
paraphrases is preferable for the best interpretation of the Gorgias' 
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me-ontology have lasted for nearly a century, with both versions 
having their adherents. 
The advocates of Sextus' version, which was most popular in the first 
half of the XXth century, put an emphasis on the rhetorical element 
of Gorgias' speech because they see Gorgias as a rhetorician and 
sophist in the pejorative meaning of the word rather than as a 
philosopher, underlining the nihilistic and subjectivist nature of his 
ideas. The followers of the Anonymous version, actively discussed 
in the second half of the last century, delineate more formal 
philosophical vs. linguistic approaches and suggest various 
"exculpatory" philosophical interpretations of Gorgias' teachings. 
One can get the impression that such a difference of sympathies stems 
from the sources on which each of the interpretations is based. To all 
appearances, however, they were formed spontaneously, due to 
particular historical-and-philosophical traditions and until recently 
were not indicative of a conscientious scholars' viewpoints. 
The paper compares the epistemic sections of the paraphrases and 
highlights philosophical problems that are either implicit in the 
Gorgias' arguments or are brought in by the narrator or, in some 
cases, the translator. In our opinion, the fact that Gorgias was perhaps 
the first to pinpoint and formulate quite serous epistemic issues, and 
his narrators were able to discern them and interpret within the 
philosophical context, important for each of them, skeptical and 
peripatetic accordingly, signifies, firstly, the equal status of both 
paraphrases – it is impossible to state that one of them is more 
rhetoric and another – more philosophical, and secondly, that Gorgias 
is not nearly a nihilist and mocker, but a serious philosopher, whose 
contribution to the ancient epistemology cannot be disregarded. 
As is well known, three sections, or structural arguments, are given 
by Gorgias in the treatise: nothing exists (non-existence); everything 
that exists cannot be known; even if such knowledge can be 
developed, its content cannot be communicated. The first section, 
accordingly, is ontological and represents Gorgias' me-ontology; the 
other two sections are epistemic. The text of the treatise contains a 
lot of references to prior, pre-Socratic philosophical thought. 
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Aristotle is considered the first historian of philosophy, who drew a 
line under pre-Socratic and Plato's contemplations about the first 
beginnings and causes, and embarked on building up his own 
philosophical teaching on this foundation. Regarding Gorgias, it is 
fair to say that his reasoning, on the one hand, drew a line under pre-
Socratic teachings about interconnections between thinking, 
existence and language, and on the other – revised the arguments 
used by them. 
It is hardly surprising that the first part of Gorgias' reasoning is often 
considered separately from the other two: the ontological and two 
epistemic parts are quite autonomous. In the first section, it is 
important for Gorgias to demonstrate the existence of non-existent, 
therefore, casting doubts on the Eleatic method.2 Criticism of the 
Eleatic method continues in two epistemic sections. 3  Parmenides 
sees the principal ability of the existent to be dwelled on and 
verbalized as the main criterion of the veracity of our knowledge 
about existence; while Gorgias proves that regardless of the being in 
question under the content of the first section of its speech – existent, 
non-existent, or both together – it is possible to neither truly conceive, 
nor correctly express neither existent, nor non-existent, and it forms 
the grounds for the narrative of impossibility of knowledge. 
Let us look into epistemic sections (arguments) and outline in the 
most general terms the principles and their argument order, observed 
by our informants narrating Gorgias' thoughts. Let us also show how 
both versions add to and precise each other in regards to paraphrasing 
the Gorgias' philosophical agenda. We believe, however, that each of 
the narrators concurrently points and comments, along with Gorgias' 
thoughts, the key insights of ancient epistemology, which Gorgias 
realized and which were relevant for pre-Plato discourse. It is, in its 
turn, important for understanding, to what extent we can basically 
 
2 For the most detailed consideration of this part of the treatise see Kerferd (1955). 
3 The epistemic sections of the Gorgias’ speech have repeatedly been in the focus 
of research. The most important conclusions for understanding ancient 
epistemology were reached in Mourelatos (1987), Striker (1996), and Caston 
(2002), 
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talk about competence of ancient epistemology before Plato. In our 
opinion, even such a comparison shows in the first approximation 
that isolated reading of the survived versions, much less abandoning 
one in favour of another, will markedly emasculate any interpretation 
of Gorgias' teaching. The structure of the paper is as follows: first, 
we table the argument order and their comparison by different 
versions; then give comments on the Table content. 
Table 1. Comparison of the argument orders in MXG and AM 
 




MXG AM  
I I argument, ontological, reasoning that the existent is 
identical to the non-existent, which forms the basis for 
subsequent arguments  
II II argument, epistemic — reasoning possible co-
dependence of thinking, being and developing knowledge  
Thesis 
(Claim) 
If х can be thought 
(known), then х necessarily 
exists, and if х does not 
exist, then х cannot be 
thought. 
If x can be thought (known), 
then х does not exist, and 
then, if х exists, it cannot be 
thought. 
1 Argument on actuality (the state of things) and non-
distinction of falsehood and truth  
(an intentional argument) 
(1)4 980a |9–10| 
If there are no things 
existent, all evidence is 
false: from the necessary 
existence of the thing 
thought is it concluded as 
per argument from the 
contraposition that it is 
impossible to think about 
things that truly do not 
exist. 
 
МaB implies ~Ba~М5 
 
VII |77|  
If things thought do not 
exist, than existence cannot 






Ма~B implies B~M 
 
(2) – |78| Explanation with an 
example similarly to 
conceivable of white (if an 
object with predicate of 
white is thought of, then 
whiteness is thought 
together with the predicate 
of white, "things thought is 
white"), and similarly, 
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4 Numbers in round brackets marks conditional steps of argument. 
5 We wrote arguments formally in both versions to show clearly that in both cases 
such Gorgias’ reasoning, which is based on the contraposition law, is rigorous 
(regardless of which version gives the authentic paraphrasing of his own exact 
language. We use the following notation for the terms used: М – some object can 
be thought, B – Being (cf. Caston, 2002). 
existence is not thought, if 
non-existence is typical for 
things thought (the law of 
contraposition). 
(3) 980a11–13 
1) Substantiating the thesis 
"things not thought are 
not (factually) the 
existence", built on 
assuming absence of false 
and as a consequence – 
inability to establish true 
existence 
(the case of chariots 
fighting on the sea). 
 
2) – 
(An argument about 
existence of things thought 
in different types 
depending on the thinking 
subjects is specially 
analyzed below, in III.2). 
VII |79|  
1) Substantiating the thesis 
"things thought are not the 
existence": refuting 
transition of things in actual 
existence as they are 
thought  
(the case of a flying man 




2) All things thought exist in 
different types, whoever 
thought them (everyone 
thinks in one's own way – an 
implicit reference to the 
Protagoras' homo mensura). 
(4) – VII |80|  
Addition:  
In its turn, a lot of non-
existent can be thought; 
An argument from the 
contraposition: if it is 
intrinsic for the existent to 
be thought, it is intrinsic for 
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the non-existent not to be 
thought (the example of 
Scylla and Chimera). 
 
МаB implies ~Bа~M 
2 A categorical argument: discerning and autonomy of 
different ways of comprehending (perception and 
thinking) (an epistemological argument) 
(5) 980a |14–15| 
Evidently, things heard etc. 
can be known, but exists 
not as a result of 
development of 
knowledge, as well as – by 
analogy – things thought 
do not acquire existence as 
a result of knowing them 
(conceivable)  
(excluding subjective 
idealism –"things seen do 
not acquire existence 
because we see them" 
(980a |14|)). 
|81–82|  
Each way of perception has 
its own criterion (things 
visible can be seen, things 
audible can be heard, but 
not vice versa, things visible 
can be heard, etc.), and they 
are not substitutes. The 
same concerns things 
thought: even if they are not 
perceived visually and are 
not audible, they all have 
their own criteria.  
(6) 980a |16–19| 
Autonomy of different 
ways of perception and 
think implies inability to 
establish, which of them 
enable a privileged access 
to true knowledge about 
things (true development 
of knowledge), therefore, 
the possibility of knowing 
things does not stem from 
external (irrespective of 
senses) existence of things 
(otherwise, the way of 
knowing things would be 
|82| 
Overturning (5) the example 
with chariots on the sea 
from the absence of 
supporting thinkable with 
factual and indicating 
absurdity: someone thinks 
something absurd, does not 
actually see it but still (only 
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unessential: think, hear or 
see, since the results of 
these processes would be 
identical). 
 
A general conclusion on II: 
Even if there are things 
existent – they are 
unknowable (ἄγνωστα 




A general conclusion on II:  
Things existent cannot be 
thought and apprehended 
(οὐκ ἄρα τὸ ὂν φρονεῖται 
καὶ καταλαμβάνεται). 
III III argument, epistemic – properties and functions of  
word / language 
1 Evidence of impossibility to communicate the content of 
knowledge: 
а through the nature of word 




words. Just as eyesight 
does not distinguish 
sounds and audition hears 
no colours, so a speaker 
pronounces words rather 
than colours or things.  
 
|83|–|84|  
The existent is external 
reality (substance), it is 
visible, heard, and generally 
perceived with senses; 
besides, visible from this 
filed is perceived through 
eyesight and audible things 
– through hearing, and not 
vice versa. Can knowledge 
about these fields of the 
existent be communicated 
with words? 
(8) 980b |4–7| 
If something is not thought 
of by somebody, then it is 
impossible to make sure 
that somebody thinks of 
exactly this object. 
Particularly, expressing it 
with words. 
|84|–|85| 
An argument on categorical 
difference of word from any 
other things existent: 
Word is neither substance 
(=external reality), nor thing 
existent, i.e., word is not 
eminently the existence, it 
does not have a 
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When a word is 
pronounced, it's not a 
sound (= produced by the 
thing) or colour (= of the 
thing) that is pronounced 
but a word (=indicating a 
sound or a colour of the 
thing), so it is impossible to 
think of color but only see 
it, like sound can only be 
heard.  
 
The conclusion: Word 
cannot be a knowledge-
development mediator 
between the one who has 
developed knowledge and 
the one who does not 
know yet since word 
communicates it is nature 
(possesses its own 
essence). 
phenomenal nature, and it 
emerges due to external 
things similarly to senses 





The conclusion: words do 





1 Evidence of impossibility to communicate the content of 
knowledge: 
б Through the law of 
contradiction 
Through the way of word 
existence  
(9) 980b |8–10| 
If a listener is told of a 
thing, he will not think of 
the same as the speaker. 
Substantiation: the same 
thing (knowledge about a 
thing) cannot be in the 
same relation in two 
different places (i.e. in two 
different minds). 
– 
(10) – |86| – |87| 
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Even assuming that word 
exists as a substrate 
(existent, phenomenal 
things), their colours or 
sounds do not make each 
other's nature clear; 
likewise, word differs from 
other substrates and does 
not express an array of 
other substrates. 
 
Word does not indicate a 
thing directly (there must be 
an intermediary between a 
word as a pronounced set 
of sounds and a thing, for 
example, the meaning of a 
word (compare with stoic 
lekton). 
Different substrates do not 
make each other's nature 
clear. 
2 Evidence that two different 
subjects cannot think of 
the same thing (through 
the law of contradiction) 
(the issue of inter- and 
intra-subjectivity) 
(absent in AM as a separate 
argument, and only briefly 
mentioned in I.1) 
(11) 980b |11–14|  
Even if two people can 
think of the same thing, it 
will not seem similar to 
them because they 
themselves are not fully 
similar and are not in the 
same place, otherwise they 
would be one rather than 
two. 
– 
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The Table shows that the general order of presenting epistemic 
arguments in the two survived versions differs insignificantly; 
however, the discrepancy in representation of arguments in the 
substantive part is considerable. 
The first – ontological – part of the Gorgias' speech (not included in 
the Table) consistently analyses the preceding philosophical 
arguments that gave particular substantiations of the principles of 
existence. The epistemic sections have a similar approach and 
Gorgias focuses his attention, first of all, on the arguments of 
(12) 980b |15–17|  
A person perceives the 
same objects in a different 
way in the same time, for 
instance, seeing and 
hearing an object, or 
discerning an object now 
and prior. Therefore, even 
one (each) person himself 
perceives everything in a 
different way, a fortiori – 
differently from another 
person.  
– 
Conclusion 980b |18–20| 
Thus, nothing exists but if 
something could be 
known, nobody would be 
able to communicate it, 
because things are not 
words, and so nobody can 
think the same as any 
other person.  
These aporiai are given 
already by the ancients, 
and should be studied 
starting from early 
philosophers.  
|87| 
If these aporiai are 
accepted, the criterion 
eludes. Since there are no 
things in existence and by 
nature they cannot be 
known or communicated, 
there is no criterion of true 
knowing. 
 GORGIAS' REVISING OF ANCIENT EPISTEMOLOGY 13 
 
Parmenides and Protagoras6, in the context of which possible co-
dependence of existence, thinking and development of knowledge is 
discussed. We see the following difference between the Gorgias' 
approach and his predecessors. Parmenides reasons exclusively about 
the qualities of thinking and conceivable of objects, emphasizing that 
veracity is connected only to intelligibility, indicated by the verb 
νοεῖν used by Parmenides (В 8.34-36 DK). Gorgias replaces νοεῖν 
with the verb φρονείν, setting a broader context for cognitive abilities 
since Gorgias conveys thinkable and knowable as τὰ φρονούμενα. 
This seemingly insignificant amendment brings the entire reasoning 
beyond the limits of the Eleatic method but at the same time gives a 
block of problems typical for it. 
As follows from the standard interpretation of Parmenides' 
fragments 7 , thinking always turns to the existent, τὸ ἐὸν. It is 
reasonable, however to ask a question, which things in existence are 
assumed exactly. According to В 8.34 DK, thought and its content 
are identical: "And the same is to be thought/known and is wherefore 
the thinking (ταὐτὸν δ' ἐστὶ νοεῖν τε καὶ οὕνεκεν ἔστι νόημα). For not 
without what-is, to which it stands committed, will you find 
thinking".8 If so, then what is the source of the content of thinking? 
Is it external to thinking, or internal, or anything else? To answer 
these questions, let's assume an obvious point of view, at the first 
glance, that speech reflects the content of our thinking and construct 
 
6 See a discussion of Protagoras’ approach in the context of Gorgias’ reasoning in 
Caston (2002, p. 217-218). 
7 The standard interpretation in the second half of the XXth cent. was based on the 
meanings of the verb to be and a common belief that Parmenides had used this verb 
in В 2.3 and В 2.5 DK subjectlessly (and without a predicate which is essential for 
some subsequent interpretations). Accordingly, the above fragments become “ἡ 
μὲν ὅπως __ ἔστιν __ τε καὶ ὡς __οὐκ ἔστι μὴ εἶναι, … ἡ δ' ὡς __ οὐκ ἔστιν __ τε 
καὶ ὡς χρεών ἐστι __ μὴ εἶναι”, with omissions on the place of subjects and 
predicates of the verb to be absent in the ancient Greek. It is considered that the 
aim of the poem is to make the listener reconstruct what truly exists, i.e. put the 
necessary subject and predicate in the omissions at verbs; different interpreters 
most often use existence as the subject of a statement (see Owen, 1960; Curd, 2004; 
Mourelatos, 2008). 
8 We used the translation by A.Mourelatos (2008, p. 257). 
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a similar hypothetic situation, where word rather than thought is the 
key object — a situation quite acceptable in the sophistic train of 
thought. Our artificially constructed case, similar to Parmenides' 
reasoning but in the sophistic problematic framework, let's formulate 
it as "word and what the word is about are identical", clearly shows 
the issue of the source of the content of thought. Unlike supposedly 
acceptable Parmenides' phraseology, it demonstrates that such line of 
reasoning has a flaw. It is clear that word and what it indicates are 
not identical: a word only designates a thing but it is not this thing. 
If, however, reasoning is about thought, an impression is created that 
thought does not indicate its content, but it itself is the content and 
cannot be directed to things external to it and its nature, first of all, it 
concerns sensual things. Thus, we can formulate the basic problem, 
to which the epistemic sections of the Gorgias' speech answer: 
whether thought can have some external existent thing as its content, 
i.e. be directed to something, and whether the existent is independent 
from thinking or is a consequence of thinking.9 
Next, following the Parmenides' line of reasoning, let's move to the 
thesis that "all thinkable necessarily exists" and it is from this point 
the epistemic section of the Gorgias' speech starts in MXG 980a |9–
10|, not forgetting about the Gorgias' amendment and understanding 
thinkable (or knowable) as τὰ φρονούμενα. The fact that the word 
belongs to the Gorgias' vocabulary is confirmed by its use in both 
versions of the paraphrasing, including the Sextus' quotation marker 
"…Gogrias says (φησὶν ὁ Γοργίας)" (AM VII |77|). 
For Parmenides, with his strict, cure-all principle of contradiction,10 
it is easy to state that any existent should be considered as the same; 
 
9 Not so much intentionality of thinking in itself as orientation of thinking towards 
non-existent was important for ancient philosophers. Discussions of the ability to 
think of non-existent (such as impossible objects Scylla or Chimera, absent states 
of things “a person flies”, “chariots fighting at the sea”, etc.) originated with 
Gorgias and Zeno of Citium, and were developed by Plato and Aristotle. For 
example, Caston (1998) shows how Aristotle developed his answer to the problem 
against the general background of the emerging issue in the Antiquity. 
10  As rightly mentioned by Scolnicov (2003, p. 13 – 14), it is senseless for 
Parmenides of Elea (not the Platonian) to point that the principle of non-
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Gorgias, however, shows that it is an overhasty step and the issue is 
much more serious than a demand to discern and do not mix the ways 
of knowing typical for intelligible and sensible worlds, especially 
when Parmenides himself uses the world of phenomena to 
substantiate a contrario his concept on conceivable of the existent. 
Unlike Parmenides' noethic veracity, it concerns any mental essence, 
"thing in mind" rather than a refined essence, reached by thinking as 
a result of true cognition.11 The point is that as soon as you claim that 
conceivable is the criterion of existence of something, and the 
veracity of the comprehended is guaranteed through thinking, you 
embark upon a very slippery slope of a number of reservations, as a 
result of which it turns out that you assume "thinking" to be only a 
particular procedure, "existent" – only what possesses a very limited 
set of extremely specific predicates. You would need to establish a 
correlation between thinkable and its predicates, however, it is not 
easy to compile the set of predicates, it requires an incredibly 
complex evidentiary and substantiating base, and the outcome is that 
this option does not suit people because only God can think in a 
 
contradiction does not work with regard to phenomenal things because 
controversial properties in them are considered in different relations. It would be a 
total violation of the general scheme of Parmenides, ignoratio elenchi: in his 
understanding, any relativist interpretation of anything existent is impossible. It is 
the basic principle, and if not accepted, the remaining construct collapses. 
 11 Therein, В 16 DK, as the entire section on “Doxas”, brings an additional block 
of issues for understanding the comparing the thoughts of Gorgias and Parmenides. 
В 16 DK says: “For such as is the state of mixture at each moment of the much-
wandering limbs, even such thoughts (νόος) occur to men. For it is the same 
[condition] that the nature of the limbs apprehends (φρονέει) among men, both all 
and each. For thoughts is “the full” (τὸ γὰρ πλέον ἐστὶ νόημα)” (the fragment is 
quoted in translation by Mourelatos (2008, p. 259)). We see how Parmenides’ 
thought shifts from thinking to comprehension at large and back, and how he makes 
thinking (or comprehension at large) dependent on the state of a body. Several 
interpretations can be suggested for this fragment: from references to the ancient 
perception theory to the theory of emerging errors in cognition due to body 
intervention and its sensations, etc., but the fact that his fragment appears in 
paraphrasing the “false” part of the poem, immediately puts in question whether 
Parmenides seriously considered any of those possibilities of cognition (About 
some interpretations and translations of B 16 DK see: Mourelatos, 2008, p. 253–
259). Parmenides does it, accepts it, but not Gorgias? 
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proposed way. What remains to people — continue being enmeshed 
in contradictions or shift to the way of thinking that becomes totally 
unproductive in terms of the tools that human beings are equipped 
with to interact with the environment? Protagoras attempted to show 
the role of sensual perceptions through homo mensura, but it did not 
clarify the status of thinking. The Gorgias' concept of τὰ φρονούμενα 
expands the field of thinking to human, including objects of thought, 
and even simply what is thought of, which, on top of it, means 
something comprehensible to the widest extent, with both senses and 
rational mind, comprising even such means of representations as 
dreams, fancies or illusions. Thus, Gorgias, unlike Parmenides' cure-
all existence, allows relativist understanding for thinkable things in 
existence because many would agree to accept existence of different 
intelligible entities, centaurs and other fantasies, any false statements 
on the grounds that they exist in some relative sense, not "for-real". 
Thus, we come to defining two issues essential for the ancient 
epistemology, which, however, do not seem something obvious or 
specific for the Antiquity outside the Gorgias' phraseology of 
epistemic problems. First, such concepts as "thing in mind", "mental 
essence" should suggest that there are issues related to subjective 
idealism. Indeed, the title thesis in MXG "all τὰ φρονούμενα (thing 
in mind) necessarily exist" can be understood that if cognitive 
abilities perceive some thing, it guarantees its existence, fully in line 
with the Berkeley's principle – "Esse est percipi aut percipere". Some 
old interpretations of Gorgias, starting with Hegel, directly claim that 
MXG is based on the principles of subjective idealism, and Gorgias 
considers even such objects that exist only in consciousness and only 
in it (compare chariots fighting in the sea)12. Considering Gorgias' 
reasoning as reductio ad absurdum, and carefully following the logic 
of his arguments, such interpretation is excluded, Gorgias clearly 
refutes this thesis (see II.2.(6) in the Table): he admits that 
Parmenides is wrong and thinking is not limited to only the rights on 
which Parmenides insists, but in case of such admission we must 
 
12 A brief analysis and refuting of those interpretations can be found in Caston 
(2002, p. 213, n. 31). 
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sacrifice not only the false – after all, if everything is thought, then 
falsehood does not exist, but also the true – since any false would 
become true, but few would believe in such "genuineness" (MXG 
980a11–13, AM VII.79). In other words, common sense, embedded 
in the concept of τὰ φρονούμενα, does not lose its criterial function. 
It suffices, however, to take a shorter route and look at a direct 
statement about it in MXG 980a|14|: "visible does not gain existence 
because we see it", which directly renounces here a possibility of a 
subjective-idealistic position. If objects that can be thought exists not 
only in mind, i.e. exist not by virtue of or due to thinking, but in some 
other, concomitant way, and the entire spectrum of object existence 
is assumed, from truly existent to material and illusory, it means that, 
and at the very least does not exclude that thought in the end can be 
directed to something. 
Therefore, we can now formulate the second problem: interpretation 
of τὰ φρονούμενα brings us to the concept of intentionality 13 . 
Thinking always must be about something, i.e. it cannot be empty, 
and it should have particular content. For Parmenides the content of 
thinking is always the same — thinkable existent, by no means 
differentiated further. We would have to specially substantiate 
Parmenides' intentionality of thinking, because it is unclear, to what 
extent it is fair to say that such thinking indeed possesses content, and 
Parmenides' νόημα is related to insights into the direction and actual 
(factual) content of thinking. As for Gorgias' thinkable things (τὰ 
φρονούμενα), evidently, there is no need to prove that they are 
intentional objects, and likewise substantiate that they relate to 
something. If, however, existence is limited to only thinking, all 
things existent turn to be mental objects. At the same time, the type 
of thinking is not essential — noetic, genuine according to 
Parmenides, or as phronesis, ordinary, not excluding relations with 
the phenomenal world, but also not losing connection with common 
sense. If things in existence are thinkable, they are mental objects and 
especially, following Parmenides, are recognized that they do not 
 
13 Overall, discussing the intentionality issue we were guided by how the problem 
is set up by Perler (2002). 
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exist in any other way, an inevitable question emerges: the mind itself 
generates objects of its thinking or takes them somewhere, from some 
external source. The Gorgias' things thinkable get another level of a 
validity check – mental objects relate to something, and, being 
"twins" of phenomenal existent things, are directed to and relate to 
them, while the extra-mental objects themselves exist even prior to 
our acts of cognition. Parmenides equates the veracity status of 
mental objects to the status of "flying Theaetetus", with the only 
difference that the latter can be casted aside as false because it would 
not pass the check of common sense and the actual state of things: 
nobody, thinking of the flying Theaetetus, begins to believe that 
people can fly, even if such object exists exclusively in our thinking, 
is not distorted with sensory perceptions, did not emerge, will not die 
and so on. In other words, the mind itself that generates such objects 
serves the criterion in the test of truth for these mental objects, but 
the objectivity principles require the criterion to be some source, 
which is external to the tested things. At the first glance, softening 
the requirements to thinkable and allowing intentionality, i.e., their 
relation to external objects, Gorgias solves the criterion problem and 
performs the test, but Gorgias' arguments show that it does not solve 
the problem, and, on the contrary, aggravates it. 
At the same time, it is also possible to talk about internationality in 
interpretation of Gorgias' epistemic sections in a softer sense, 
transferring the issue into the interpretational context: intentional 
interpretation means that it refers to any objects that can be thought 
and perceived in any way, somehow be engaged in cognitive 
processes, presence of knowledge is either accepted or denied; 
epistemic interpretation raises a question whether any of cognitive 
abilities has a privileged access to the reality, while the knowledge, 
acquired as a result, is differentiated as true and false. Interpretation 
of the II epistemological section ONB is built upon exactly this 
differentiation (see the Table), and here we rely on the approach 
of Caston (2002), who suggests to discern two Gorgias' arguments in 
the second part, designating them as the intentional and 
epistemological arguments. The specifics of the intentional argument 
is that it does not mention any particular type of a mental state, 
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through which knowledge is developed; it is only essential how it 
relates to existence (or non-existence) of an object, regardless of 
whether the object relates to any actual state of things and whether 
conclusions about it are true or false. The epistemological argument 
clarifies if any of our mental states (vision, hearing, thinking or 
speech) has a privileged status with regard to all others and 
guarantees if not true, than at least a more accurate development of 
knowledge (Caston, 2002, p.21, 224). Overall, it means that already 
the basic Gorgias' terminology creates a lot of problems, typical not 
only for the Antiquity but also for the modern epistemology. 
The epistemological part of ОНС has two sections, II and III 
epistemic arguments in the general numbering of the argument steps, 
counting the I ontological part. The general structure is given in the 
Table. Next, let's briefly characterize the basic problematic fields 
presented in both versions of the paraphrasing in the context of the 
above-mentioned questions and highlight the specifics of each 
version. 
Section II.1. considers the relation of thinking and existence and 
defines the issue of interpreting the initial thesis in the context of the 
overall reasoning: whether the solution of the issue can be reduced to 
the standpoint of subjective idealism, i.e. assume that thinking about 
a thing, in the Gorgias' opinion, precedes its existence. The Table 
demonstrates that MXG reasoning is shorter. Sextus formulates the 
initial thesis as Ма~B implies Bа~M, and moves to considering the 
option that МaB implies ~Ba~М as one of the assumptions only in 
the forth step of the argument, while the Anonym right away reduces 
the entire first epistemic argument exactly to this point (see argument 
steps (1) and (4) in the Table). Otherwise, the meaning of this block 
of reasoning is generally identical in both versions, including the 
examples given. 
In the MXG version, it is possible to talk about the epistemic 
argument already in the step (3) in II.1: 980a11–13 raises an issue of 
a criterion as the way to discern truth from falsehood. Although 
Gorgias does not say here, which of the mental states leads to the 
true, and which to false development of knowledge, transferring the 
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discussion in the context of true and false sets a principally different 
layout rather than simply orientation of thinking to the object of 
cognition. Everything becomes known either as true, or as false. A 
person sees the world and makes judgments about it. These 
judgments can align with established facts or can be contrarily to the 
reality, i.e. be false, as in the case of flying chariots. Since false aligns 
with unreliable facts, non-existent, then in accord with the Eleatic 
arguments it becomes clear that if falsehood is non-existence, then it 
is impossible to lie, false becomes non-expressible, and accordingly, 
all expressible becomes true.14 This, in its turn, makes all things not 
only true but also, under the truth criterion — identical, although it is 
evident that these things differ by ways of comprehending. Apart 
from the obvious referencing to the Eleatic methods of problem 
setting, the section also contains clear references to the Protagoras' 
agenda that "human is measures" and "nobody can lie and contradict 
the other". The first thesis is most clear in Sextus, step [(3) 2)] 
"thinkable exists in different types, no matter how and who thinks 
them", while the second forms the grounds to build up the entire step 
of the argument. 
Section II. 2. is identical in both versions, and contains a categorical 
argument,15 criticizing the nature of linguistic meaning as a reference 
that develops a thought about distinguishing things by ways of 
comprehending, and moves directly to the proof that ways of 
comprehending (mental conditions) cannot be reduced to each other 
in principle. One can read the Parmenides' thesis about the privileged 
status of thinking as the basis of the argument, which, however, is 
refuted through relating thinking and other mental conditions. First 
of all, the point is put into question that external existence of a thing, 
independent from any mental state whatsoever, guarantees its 
 
14 Plato raised the same issues in the Sophist when attempting to give a definition 
of a sophist based on what the latter does. In fact, the issue was reduced to the 
attempt to define false, i.e., say something true about false. The discussion plan 
and similar examples (a flying person, etc.) shows a close correlation between 
Plato’s reasoning and Gorgias’ ONB. 
15 The argument from categories is discussed in Mourelatos (1987). 
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comprehension. On the one hand, thing, independent from a 
particular sense, does not emerge and is not formed with this sense in 
the process of cognition, which means that it can be comprehended 
through other, independent ways. On the other hand, however, it 
exactly creates a problem: autonomy of senses and mental states, 
their non-reducibility to each other does not allow to consider that the 
result of cognition is correct. Otherwise, it would not be important, 
which method is used to develop knowledge about things — thinking, 
hearing or seeing — the results of these processes would be identical. 
Inner confidence in one's rightness in the course of thinking a 
particular thing without substantiation with external facts is equally 
insufficient. The latter argument is outlined in AM. 
Section III also evidently illustrates a common problem for both 
paraphrasing – understanding the essence of word. III.1 discusses the 
nature of word and refutes a popular supposition that word, or speech 
is a mediator between sensitive and rational fields. Both narrators 
agree that word cannot serve as a mediator between external objects 
and the content of the knowledge about them. Speech has its own 
autonomous cognitive status and is yet another way of developing 
knowledge along with other cognitive abilities. Both narrators also 
agree that words are formed the same way as other senses — through 
impact from external objects.16 
There is an important difference between the two sections: MXG 
translated reasoning into a subjective area and focuses on what 
happens when objects are thought, pronounced or comprehended 
 
16  Let’s point out that the range of problems raised in this section is closely 
connected to the Aristotle’s perception theory as formulated in DA III.2 (425b25 
onwards), – about communicating forms from an object of perception to a subject 
“without matter”, and, accordingly, about the principles of correlation of things, 
perception and thinking stemming from them (the concept of representation as 
perceived without matter, 432а5). Caston (1998) shows that these issues are closely 
linked to the intentionality issue. In this case, this section of Gorgias’ reasoning 
requires separate consideration in comparison with the Aristotle’s position in De 
anima, especially because both the peripatetic version - MXG and the Sextus’ 
version, oriented towards the stoic agenda, are in either case determined by the 
Aristotelian context. 
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using organs of senses by somebody, while Sextus continues 
reasoning about discerning things by ways of comprehending and 
looks at things in existence, building on a stoic concept of "external 
reality" (τὸ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενον). His reasoning focuses on whether 
word is such external reality, a standalone substrate, or it emerges 
thanks to these substrates, as a response to an impact from outside, 
received from such a substrate. 
Rather than demonstrating the categorical difference between words 
and other means of comprehension (which is typical for MXG), it is 
important for Sextus to show that there is some dependence between 
word and an external object. He draws attention that word is the most 
distinct among all other "senses". For example, compared to visible, 
word does not indicate a thing directly as a seen image of a thing and 
the thing itself, and it is not directly connected to a thing. It can exist 
"in isolation" from a thing, pronounces separately, and it is exactly 
this specifics of word that is misleading, forcing to think that it is a 
consequence of thinking. In fact, it is not word that explains an 
external object, but an external object explains word. 
Putting such emphases in its narrative, Sextus actively relies on the 
stoic agenda. The autonomy of word assumes a particular mediator 
between word and thing, close to what we understand to be meaning, 
or what stoics used to call lekton, and concept (undefined thought) in 
the Middle Ages, and so on. Sextus authored a frequently quoted 
fragment about the stoic concept of designative as verbalization of a 
designated thing (τὸ λεκτόν), where he uses the "external reality" 
concept. As Sextus writes (AM VIII.2, 11–12), stoics believed that 
"three [elements] get connected: designated, designative and an 
object". An object is what is outside (τὸ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενον), 
designative is a word, or sound designation of a thing, and these two 
elements are material. Designated is a thing itself as it is established 
in our mind, and precisely because of it we are able to relate an 
external object and the relevant word, i.e. what transforms a 
combination of sounds into a meaningful expression, gives meaning 
to words. Thus, it is the Sextus' paraphrasing of Gorgias that raises 
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the issue of reference as a relation between thing, word and meaning, 
which is totally absent as such in the Antonym's narrative. 
The Anonym broaches a problem differently. A listener can be told 
about a thing but he will not get knowledge about it, not even because 
of the autonomy of speech as a cognitive ability, but due to the law 
of contradiction. It is the phrasing of the law of contradiction in the 
narrative by the Anonym that goes under the name of Gorgias, long 
before Plato and Aristotle: "the same cannot be simultaneously 
present in many and separate [persons]; since in this case one would 
become two" (MXG 980b10). It's very tempting to state that Gorgias 
was to first to phrase this law, except for a consensus among scholars 
that the Anonym himself belonged to the Peripatetic school, and in 
this case the use of the law in the narrative is rather an explanation of 
the argument due to adherence to the school, especially because there 
are no references to the law in the Sextus' version. 
Section III.2 in the structure of arguments is present in an expanded 
form only in the Anonym' narrative and it focuses on inter-
subjectivity of cognition. One cannot say, however, that this point is 
fully absent in the Sextus' version: he introduces an important 
reservation in the reasoning in section II.1. that all thinkable exists in 
different forms, regardless of who and how thinks them, although 
Sextus does not consider this argument in detail. Only the Anonym 
gives such analysis, which, like the previous argument, is based on 
the law of contradiction, and this time the Anonym applies it to inter-
subjective cognition as well as to an individual. The meaning of the 
argument is that the same knowledge cannot be in the same relation 
in the minds of two different people, otherwise they would be the 
same person instead of two. To the same degree, this requirement is 
applicable to a person: the same person does not maintain one's 
equivalence in time, or space, or categorically — he either sees the 
same object, or hears it, etc. Gorgias essentially anticipates the 
phrasing of the skeptic relativity trop (P. I. 38–40), that later will be 
used by Sextus widely, so it is particularly intriguing, why Sextus 
himself did not give this part of reasoning in his version. 
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Therefore, it would be safe to assume that even as first approximation 
both version of Gorgias' paraphrasing are equal in terms of their 
philosophical value. It is impossible to state that any of them 
observed exclusively rhetoric or sophistry, while the other focuses 
only on philosophical problems. They consistently and similarly 
represent the Gorgias' philosophical content. At the same time, they 
add to each other, one version contains parts and examples that are 
absent in another, and judging by indirect factors, one can assume 
that parts that are missing in different version, nevertheless, were 
included in the original version. It's another matter that substantively 
both narratives give different interpretations of arguments; for 
example, as we saw, the peripatetic version from the Anonym builds 
its argumentation upon the law on contradiction, while the Sextus' 
version is based on discussions between skeptics, stoics and 
epicureans typical for the Hellenistic period. It, however, does not 
impact the overall philosophical nature of the entire range of 
problems, and on the contrary, shows the engagement of the sophistic 
agenda in the general philosophical paradigm, and at the same time 
— its acceptability and significance for further (particularly, modern) 
epistemological discussions. 
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